/html
WHO CONTROLS
AMERICA’S ENERGY FUTURE?
The Threat. The Defense. The American Alternative.
America’s military installations, data centers, communications networks, emergency services, and critical infrastructure increasingly depend on advanced energy storage and intelligent electrical power systems.
The strategic question is no longer simply who manufactures the cheapest battery. It is who controls the technology, materials, manufacturing capacity, software, communications, and supply chains upon which America’s essential operations depend.
POWER IS A MISSION SYSTEM.
China’s Battery Dominance Is an Energy Security Challenge.
China has established a commanding position across much of the global battery industry, including battery-cell manufacturing, materials processing, equipment supply, and increasingly sodium-ion technology.
According to International Energy Agency reporting, China accounts for more than 80 percent of global lithium-ion battery manufacturing capacity. Its industrial position reflects substantial investment, production scale, vertically integrated supply chains, and an established manufacturing ecosystem.
Chinese manufacturers are now extending those advantages into sodium-ion batteries. CATL has publicly announced sodium-ion products and commercial partnerships targeting electric transportation and stationary energy storage.
Sodium-ion technology offers important opportunities to reduce dependence on lithium and certain other battery materials. However, switching battery chemistry does not automatically eliminate dependence on Chinese-controlled manufacturing, components, or processing capacity.
Industrial Concentration
Heavy concentration of battery production capacity creates exposure to disruptions, export restrictions, and changes in foreign supply.
Technology Dependence
Batteries, power electronics, firmware, and controls can create long-term dependencies on external manufacturers and proprietary services.
Mission Consequences
Loss of essential electrical power can compromise operational capability, interrupt essential functions, prevent mission execution, or place lives at risk.
Security Concerns Are Supported by Federal Assessments.
The national-security implications of foreign-influenced energy storage are not limited to political discussion. Federal agencies have examined supply-chain risks, control-system connectivity, cybersecurity, and the consequences of equipment dependence.
A January 2025 Department of Energy battery-storage supply-chain risk assessment examined vulnerabilities involving battery energy storage systems, operational controls, communications, external connectivity, and supplier-related exposure.
The assessment addresses the importance of securing the complete battery energy storage system, not merely the individual cells.
Following national-security concerns raised by members of Congress, Duke Energy announced plans to decommission a CATL-manufactured battery system associated with Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune and replace it with equipment from a domestic or allied supplier.
That decision demonstrates the influence of supply-chain security on actual infrastructure procurement. It does not establish that CATL equipment contained malware or had conducted surveillance.
Federal cybersecurity agencies have documented Chinese state-sponsored activity targeting American critical infrastructure networks.
Those intrusions demonstrate a genuine infrastructure cybersecurity threat. They do not establish that Chinese-manufactured batteries were the attack vector.
Reuters reported allegations in 2025 concerning undocumented communications functionality in certain Chinese-made power equipment.
Subsequent federal technical work reported in 2026 did not substantiate intentionally malicious wireless functionality in the equipment examined.
These findings reinforce the need for verifiable equipment inventories, controlled communications, and independent assessment rather than unsupported assumptions.
The distinction is critical: Foreign manufacture alone is not evidence of malicious functionality. But procurement, software dependence, connectivity, and hardware provenance are legitimate security considerations for critical power systems.
What Could This Mean for Americans Using Foreign-Controlled Power Systems?
Modern power systems are increasingly dependent on software, communications, battery management systems, power conversion equipment, and external maintenance services.
These technologies can deliver major operational benefits. They can also create exposure when a system depends on unverified suppliers, undocumented interfaces, or remote services outside the owner’s control.
Remote Access
Unnecessary connectivity or poorly controlled maintenance pathways may increase the opportunity for unauthorized access.
Supply Disruption
Dependence on foreign components, software support, or replacement parts can complicate sustainment during international disruptions.
Operational Dependence
Systems that require external services for essential functions can expose critical operations to connectivity or vendor outages.
For consumers, these concerns can affect serviceability, software support, privacy, and long-term equipment availability. For military and critical infrastructure operators, the consequences may extend to mission failure or interruption of essential services.
The BCPE Response: American-Made. American-Controlled. Mission-Focused.
Beech Creek Power & Energy approaches energy security through the complete mission-critical power architecture. Our focus extends from generation and energy storage to electrical distribution, communications, controls, protection, construction, commissioning, and long-term sustainment.
We are not simply proposing to substitute one battery manufacturer for another. Our approach is to address identifiable vulnerabilities through deliberate engineering, domestic manufacturing requirements, secure system integration, and operational independence.
THREAT: Foreign Supply Dependence
Critical equipment and its supporting components may depend on concentrated overseas manufacturing capacity.
DEFENSE: American Manufacturing
BCPE’s sourcing standard emphasizes U.S.-made equipment, domestic manufacturing, U.S.-controlled operations, and documented component provenance.
THREAT: Wireless Exposure
Wireless radios, external networks, and uncontrolled communications interfaces can expand the cyber attack surface.
DEFENSE: Controlled Wired Communications
BCPE favors power-line communications where technically appropriate, together with dedicated shielded wired connections when required. No unnecessary Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or cellular interfaces in mission-critical control pathways.
THREAT: Remote Operational Dependence
Systems dependent on external authorization or cloud-based services may lose functionality when connectivity is disrupted.
DEFENSE: Independent Local Control
Essential control, protection, dispatch, and recovery functions are designed to remain under authorized local operational authority without mandatory foreign cloud dependencies.
THREAT: Electromagnetic Disturbance
Electrical and electronic systems can be vulnerable to severe electromagnetic disturbances, including HEMP-related effects in designated threat environments.
DEFENSE: HEMP-Hardened Shelters
Where required, BCPE solutions can incorporate engineered HEMP-protective shelters, shielded enclosures, hardened penetrations, filtering, surge protection, grounding, bonding, and appropriate verification.
THREAT: Undocumented System Interfaces
Unknown firmware, hardware, communications pathways, and maintenance capabilities complicate system security and accountability.
DEFENSE: Verification and Control
BCPE’s engineering philosophy emphasizes documented configuration, supplier qualification, authenticated access, system testing, independent validation, and traceable components.
Protecting the Entire Power System, Not Just the Battery.
For military installations, command-and-control facilities, expeditionary operations, and other high-consequence applications, mission assurance may require more than conventional electrical protection.
Where mission requirements dictate, BCPE’s integrated solutions can incorporate HEMP-protective shelters and hardened power infrastructure addressing critical equipment and supporting electrical interfaces.
Shielded enclosures may protect selected generation controls, battery systems, inverters, switching equipment, and operational electronics.
Cables crossing protective boundaries require suitable filtering, transient protection, bonding, and other engineered treatments.
Shielding performance, system acceptance criteria, and test procedures must be defined against the actual threat and applicable requirements. MIL-STD-188-125 is one relevant HEMP protection standard for designated applications.
Protecting a battery alone is insufficient if the controls, distribution systems, communications, and electrical interfaces remain exposed.
HEMP protection is a configurable mission-specific capability, not a claim that every BCPE installation requires or automatically includes it.
One Mission. One Integrated Solution.
BCPE is not another equipment vendor. We provide soup-to-nuts, mission-critical power and energy solutions.
Our scope encompasses threat-informed requirements development, systems engineering and design, equipment sourcing, generation, energy storage, distribution, controls, construction, integration, commissioning, hardening, and sustainment.
Our strategic equipment and manufacturing relationships support a broader integrated solution in which equipment selection follows the mission, not the other way around.
The GSN Advanced Energy Storage Program
BCPE is also developing its Graphene-Sodium-NASICON (GSN) sodium-metal solid-state battery architecture. This development program is intended to establish a lithium-free and vanadium-free energy storage technology suitable for future mission-critical applications.
GSN remains under development. Electrochemical performance, manufacturing readiness, supply-chain qualification, and final product capabilities must be demonstrated through progressive testing and independent validation.
American manufacturing, secure communications, independent local operational control, and mission survivability are BCPE engineering and sourcing requirements. Specific compliance and performance claims remain subject to verification for each delivered system.
The United States Is Taking Battery Supply-Chain Security Seriously.
Federal law increasingly addresses foreign-entity-of-concern participation in advanced battery supply chains.
Under 10 U.S.C. Section 4865, restrictions affecting certain Department of Defense battery acquisitions are being phased in beginning in 2028, with additional applicability dates and statutory exceptions.
The precise procurement implications depend on product classifications, covered entities, applicable regulations, exceptions, and contract requirements.
For federal installations, defense contractors, and critical infrastructure operators, supply-chain security should therefore be treated as an engineering and procurement consideration—not simply a purchasing preference.
Research, Federal Findings and Supporting References
This analysis distinguishes documented technical risks, federal findings, company announcements, and reported allegations. The references below provide the basis for further examination.
Battery Energy Storage Supply Chain Risk Assessment, January 2025.
Read federal technical assessment
House Report 118-633, including discussion of CATL battery equipment at Camp Lejeune.
Read congressional report
Joint cybersecurity advisory addressing PRC state-sponsored Volt Typhoon activity, February 2024.
Read joint security advisory
Global battery industry, manufacturing concentration, and energy technology supply-chain assessments.
Explore IEA battery research
Restrictions on acquisition of certain batteries and related components.
Review federal statute
MIL-STD-188-125-1: HEMP protection for fixed facilities performing critical, time-urgent missions.
Review military standard
2025 allegations concerning undocumented communications functionality, together with 2026 reporting on federal findings that did not establish intentionally malicious equipment in the units examined.
Reuters news and investigations
Research and analysis prepared for public education and technical discussion. References to identified manufacturers do not establish misconduct or malicious activity. BCPE’s proposed technical protections and future product capabilities are subject to engineering, testing, procurement qualification, and applicable regulatory requirements.
A SECURE POWER SYSTEM.
NOT JUST ANOTHER BATTERY.
Energy independence requires more than a domestic label. It requires assured access to equipment, operational control, verified supply chains, resilient architecture, and the ability to sustain essential functions when conventional assumptions fail.
POWER IS A MISSION SYSTEM.
Resilient Power. Mission Focused.
EXPLORE BCPE CAPABILITIES →